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Lesotho's losing parties' tradition o f  disputing electoral results reflects the fragility o f  
the country's democracy. Yet, not only is Lesotho's democracy fragile, it also faces  
formidable obstacles. Although various theoretical explanations, includingthe 
historical, modernisation and personal rule arguments have been offered as the causes 
of democratic decadence, this paper argues that the crisis o f  democracy in Africa in 
general and Lesotho in particular is rooted in the weakness o f  the economy. Economic 
underdevelopment spawns and exacerbates unemployment, scarcity and poverty. 
Under conditions o f  scarcity, the state inevitably becomes both the channel and the 
source o f  accumulation. Competition fo r  the control o f  the slate thus becomes keen. 
The incessant practice o f  vanquished parties in Lesotho disputing electoral results is 
a manifestation o f  the struggle among political elites to control the state. The fragility  
of Lesotho's economy thus remains the greatest challenge to democratic stability. Tins 
notwithstanding, Lesotho has the potential to establish a durable democracy. This 
optimism is pemised, among other things, on the country's homogenous character, the 
potentially positive role o f  the country's monarchy, the tolerant culture o f  the Basotho, 
as well as the potentially positive contribution o f  South Afr,ca. In the fina l analysis, 
however, Lesotho will still need to address the critical questions o f  unemployment and  
poverty, which are traditional catalysts fo r  conflicts.
Introduction
Lesotho's nascent post-independent democracy remains fragile. Since the first 
democratic elections which instated the Basotho National Party (BNP) as the 
ruling government in 1965, democracy in the mountain Kingdom has 
demonstrated extreme enfeeblement, marked by incessant conflicts and
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contestatins over electoral results and once punctuated by military intervention 
(Sekatle, 1999). Developments in the aftermath o f the 1998 general elections in 
which the Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD) won a landslide victory' 
further revealed the crisis in Lesotho's democracy. The victory o f the LCD in this 
particular election was seriously contested by some opposition parties, including 
the Basutoland Congress Party (BCP), the Basotho National Party (BNP), and 
the Marema-Tlou Freedom Party (MFP) These parties cried foul and, appealing 
to the King, called for the annulment of the electoral results, the dissolution o f the 
LCD government and the establishment o f a Government o f National Unity 
(GNU). As these demands failed to dislodge the LCD, the opposition parties 
resorted to protest marches, stay-away strikes and for nearly two months 
occupied the gate of the Royal Palace. In time, these protests boiled over into full- 
scale conflicts between government and opposition supporters. The intensity of 
the conflict and the accompanying lawlessness and insecurity brought economic 
life in the capital city, Maseru, to a standstill. Paralysed and incapable of 
containing the escalating conflict, the ruling LCD requested the military 
intervention o f South Africa whose troops were later joined by those from 
Botswana under the auspices of the Southern Africa Development Community 
(SADC). The intriguing, sometimes ugly, events such as looting and the burning 
down o f some of the country's commercial centres that unfolded in the wake of, 
and after, the SADC intervention have been well documented and analysed and 
need not detain us here (Makoa, 1999; Matlosa, 1999). At a deeper level, 
however, those incidents underscored the fragility o f Lesotho's tenuous 
democracy.
Yet Lesotho is not the only African country to witness such acrimonious 
contestations over electoral results. Electoral results have at various times been 
disputed in Cameroon, Gabon, Ghana, Sierra Leone, Nigeria and lately Malawi, 
to mention just a few. There seems, therefore, to be a recurring trend o f disputing 
electoral results in Africa. What is significant about Lesotho's case, however, is 
that although intense and prolonged protests failed to reverse the results or topple 
the LCD, the opposition coalition nonetheless won at least three major 
concessions unprecedented in African politics. First, after some period of 
reluctance on the part of the parties, particularly the opposition coalition, the 
South-African-led peace negotiation under the chairmanship o f the Safety and
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Security Minister, Mr. Sydney Mufamadi, finally took off. This is sharply 
contrasted with the intransigent and hardened postures o f disputing parties in the 
Democratic Republic o f Congo (DRC), Angola and Sierra Leone, for example. 
Second, the LCD agreed to shorten its original term of office from five to two 
years. This was a significant compromise borne out o f concessions from both 
sides - the opposition coalition dropped its initial demand for the dissolution o f 
the government and the formation o f a GNU, while the LCD retracted from its 
earlier insistence of being mandated to govern for five years. Third, govemment- 
opposition talks culminated in the formation o f an Interim Political Authority 
(IPA), a 24-member body whose duty, among other things, was to prepare the 
grounds for the country's next general elections in 2000. The creation o f the IPA 
was critical since it was not only dominated by the opposition, but ideally it also 
provided a platform for the participation of the opposition in the country's 
immediate post-crisis politics. The significance and perhaps uniqueness o f the 
concessions are appreciated against the background of the fact that in most 
countries, opposition protests against electoral results have mostly fallen on deaf 
ears and largely swept underneath the carpet.
Given the practice o f contesting, sometimes rejecting electoral outcomes by 
vanquished constituencies, democracy and the electoral process in particular seem 
to face an uncertain future not only in Lesotho but also in Africa. With the post- 
1998 election conflict as the main, though not exclusively the only, point o f 
reference, this paper attempts to unravel the theoretical explanations for the 
inability o f Lesotho to nurture durable democracy. The paper also assess the 
chances of the country's democratic stability. It argues that democratic instability 
in Lesotho results from the weaknesses o f the economy. The country's dependent 
posture and its fragile economy unleash severe pressures that create formidable 
obstacles for sustainable democratic development. It argues further that unlike 
most African states, Lesotho nevertheless possesses considerable potential for 
long-term democratic stability. It is imperative, therefore, to reconstruct some of 
the popular theoretical explanations for the failure o f democracy in Africa.
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The problems of democracy: some theoretical explanations
A myriad o f distinct and interrelated explanations has appeared in the literature 
for the dismal performance o f democracy in Africa. Dominant among these are 
the historical, the modernisation, the personal rule, and the economic arguments. 
Although we will argue that the economic argument is the most credible, it is 
appropriate to review, albeit cursorily, the central assumptions and the apparent 
weaknesses o f each o f the paradigms. The historical explanations for Africa's 
inability to sustain democracy are varied but all focus on the paralysing legacies 
o f colonialism. According to one variant, colonialism bequeathed strong 
authoritarian traditions which the new African leaders subsequently patronised 
(Callaghy, 1986: 40). From this perspective dictatorship and intolerance of 
dissent which militate against sustainable democracy are historical and traceable 
to colonial rule. Another perspective argues that the granting o f political 
independence was hasty and because few or no Africans served in government, 
they were left practically inexperienced to assume the complex art o f governance, 
particularly managing the intricacies o f westem-style democracy (Chazan et al, 
1988: 43). A further version o f the historical argument opines that the post­
colonial state was characteristically incompatible with stable democracy. The 
carving out o f states, the argument goes, was arbitrary as it parcelled out 
homogenous groups into different slates while simultaneously regrouping 
different, often mutually hostile, entities within the same territorial boundaries. 
This process established or exacerbated conditions for disagreements and 
conflicts among constituencies. It is in this context that African states are 
characterised as artificial (Wiseman, 1990: 14). They are artificial creations 
because in contrast to western states, which evolved over long periods o f time, 
African states were overnight creations, lacking organic evolution from within 
civil society. In metaphorical terms, then, the typical African state was built upon 
a sandy foundation as a result o f which it became incapable o f supporting 
democracy. A last variant, which is to some extent akin to the economic 
argument, traces democratic decadence to conditions o f dependency established 
by colonialism for Africa on the West. A logical extension o f the argument is that 
such dependency imposed severe constraints on socio-economic development and 
democracy.
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Yet, as a theoretical explanation, the historical argument requires some 
interrogation. In the first place the paradigm cannot explain why as a result of 
incessant conflicts Ethiopia and Liberia which were never formally colonised 
failed to sustain their respective democracies, while colonised states like 
Botswana or Tanzania have been relatively stable. Moreover, it is puzzling why 
socially homogenous countries like Somalia and Lesotho witnessed intense intra­
state conflicts while heterogeneous countries like Tanzania and Senegal have been 
relatively peaceful. Elsewhere in North America and Europe, a large number o f 
countries, including Canada, the United States and Belgium, which have built 
strong and stable democracies, are multi-racial or multi-ethnic. Thus while the 
historical explanations provide useful insights into the complexities o f African 
societies, it can scarcely offer a holistic explanation for the crisis o f democracy 
in Africa.
The modernisation paradigm, another popular argument, locates the problems of 
democratic development in the nature and the fragility of Africa's political 
institutions. According to this classic 1960 proposition, African states are 
characterised by parochial political cultures, dramatised in low political 
participation and fragile institutions. These factors arc compounded by the 
prevalence of such divisive centripetal forces as the tribe and clan, which compete 
with the state for the allegiance o f citizens (Huntington, 1968). Since they lack 
effective restraining mechanisms on the quest for power, polities with weak 
institutions are, as a rule, vulnerable to instability. Also, in such societies the 
chances of military and societal politicisation are high, a trend that poses serious 
threats to democracy. The prognosis o f the modernisation thesis is, however, 
fundamentally flawed since it cannot display consistent patterns o f correlational 
linkages between parochial cultures and instability. There are a few African 
countries that have been relatively democratic over reasonable periods o f time 
with parochial cultures and w'eak institutions. More generally, the modernisation 
paradigm is descriptive rather than analytical. It docs not, for example, explain 
the origins o f institutional decay which is so central to its analysis but merely 
assumes an endless tautological cycle o f cause and effect: democracy fails 
because o f institutional decay, and there is institutional decay because o f the 
absence o f democracy.
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The personal rule argument, in a broader sense, an extension o f the modernisation 
analysis, is premised on the predisposition of Africa's political elite to personalise 
power and to cling to it for as long as possible. They do this by creating and 
maintaining supportive constituencies with the use o f material rewards and 
sinecure appointments, while at the same time using a mix o f repression and co­
optation to suppress dissent. The symbiotic relation between the leader and his 
clients ensures the strength and longevity o f the former, who increasingly 
becomes less amenable to institutions and the constitution. Consequently, 
personal rulers abuse office with impunity thus compromising the tenets of 
democracy. Moreover, given its visible trappings, loyalty to the strongman 
becomes a crucial avenue for accumulation (Jackson and Roseberg, 1982; 
Hodder-Williams 1984). This process generates considerable disaffection among 
constituencies lacking access to the ruler and the political system, who are 
frequently tempted to resort to unconventional methods to dethrone the 
strongman. In general, personal rule undermines democracy because it privileges 
selected constituencies and defies the prescriptions o f established institutions. 
Like the modernisation theory in which it is rooted, the argument is not entirely 
persuasive as it fails to specify the origin o f the phenomenon.
The crux of the economic argument, which is presented here as the most plausible 
explanation for democratic failures, is that prospects for democratic sustainability 
are higher in strong and growing economies than in weak and fragile economies; 
that economic growth leads inexorably to democratic stability. Two levels of 
explanation can be adduced for this. The first level, theoretical and evident in the 
neo-liberal literature, entails two components. The first component proceeds on 
the logic that a growing economy produces winners and losers. The former 
coalesces to defend their newly attained opportunities while the latter form groups 
to seek improvements in their conditions. The emergence o f multiple groups 
provides a base for political pluralism. There is thus a certain degree o f inherent 
automaticity in the linkage between a flourishing economy and democratic 
sustainability (Fukuyama, 1989). The second component argues that economic 
development promotes democracy in the sense o f decentralising power from the 
state. A thriving economy bears a strong middle class, which amasses and 
controls economic power thereby ensuring separation between political and 
economic power. The latter becomes a counterweight to the former thus
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preventing the emergence o f political dictatorship (Friedman, 1962: 9; Robison, 
1988: 57). This logic is implied in Moore's (1966) popular but succinct dictum: 
"no bourgeoisie, no democracy". Lipset (1960: 49-50) is even more lucid in 
stating that: "the more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will 
sustain democracy." In other words, a society without a thriving economy, and a 
strong middle class is shaky and susceptible to political dictatorship and 
instability.
On the second, more practical, level a fledgling economy unleashes pressures in 
the form o f scarcity and poverty, which undermine the basis o f compromises, 
exacerbate social tensions, and intensifies distributional conflicts, all o f which are 
anathematic to democracy. The correlates o f a weak and declining economy - 
scarcity, unemployment, poverty, inflation and harsh economic conditions - pose 
serious threats to democracy in a variety o f ways. In the first place, impoverished 
people are generally more preoccupied with basic economic surv ival than with 
agitation for democratic rights. Since for such people the pursuit o f fundamental 
human rights is a secondary' issue, in fact a luxury', they tend to be apathetic 
towards governance. Such apathy provides congenial grounds for the pursuit of 
undemocratic practices by the political elite and the consequent emergence o f 
dictatorship.
Secondly, people who are poor and hungry' and w ho for long periods hardly attain 
minimally acceptable standards o f living are pliable to manipulations and 
deception by military adventures making vain promises o f better economic 
conditions. The impoverished and unemployed are often the first to rally behind 
military generals and self-styled revolutionaries who subvert constitutional rule. 
Similarly, economic adversities exemplified in protracted periods o f 
unemployment, skyrocketing inflation and plummeting real wages, exhaust public 
patience and in time degenerate into protests. Over time, such protests can be 
sufficiently intense as to translate into armed opposition against the state and thus 
undermine the constitutional order. Thus, a democratically elected government 
runs the risk o f confronting political turbulence if economic pains and 
uncertainties continue to take a toll on the population.
Further, under conditions o f scarcity and austerity, as is the case in Africa, the
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state inevitably becomes a channel o f accumulation. Competition for the control 
o f the state and its shrinking resources grows keener and often generates intense 
conflicts. This has adverse implications for democracy and the electoral process. 
The holders o f political power become increasingly reluctant to relinquish it for 
risk of losing their source o f wealth and accumulation; they cling on to power by 
fair but most often by foul means, thus undermining popular faith in the country’s 
electoral process. As a logical response, constituencies outside the corridors of 
power, resort to unorthodox methods, since the electoral process can no longer 
be trusted, to capture state power. Under such conditions, competition for control 
over the state no longer depict politics as a game of winners and losers, but rather 
as warfare o f victors and vanquished. The political game becomes an issue of 
survival, literally a matter of life and death. Thus, writing about the developing 
world. Diamond and Linz (1989) note that economic crisis presents the greatest 
threat to democracy. Generally, weak democracies lack strong institutional checks 
on the abuse o f political power. Corruption in high places becomes a norm, 
exerting additional strains on the economy. A weakened economy in turn leads 
to the further weakening o f democracy. Thus, at a general level, an economy in 
decline is both a cause and an effect o f democratic decadence. It can thus be 
plausibly argued that although the historical and modernisation explanations 
provide some insights into the problems and complexity o f democracy, the 
economic explanation seems more credible not only for Africa but Lesotho in 
particular. Lesotho's post-election conflict must therefore be understood against 
a background o f the pressures unleashed by a fledgling economy dramatised by 
a scarcity o f resources and competition.
Lesotho: the political economy of a fragile democracy
Key indicators o f Lesotho's economy reveal both its fragility and potential to 
im part adversely on democratic stability. With a land area o f 30,335 square 
kilometres (11,720 sq. miles), Lesotho has a population o f 2,089,892. The 
country is landlocked and yet with only one neighbour - it is eclipsed by South 
Africa. This geographic attribute has left the country heavily dependent on South 
Africa. For example, the bulk of Lesotho's trade is with South Africa and obtains 
virtually all its electricity from its big neighbour. Recently, however, Lesotho has 
completed the first phase of a multi-billion dollar Lesotho Highlands Water
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Project (LHWP) which will enable it export water to South Africa and also 
become self-sufficient in its power needs. As well, Lesotho relies on South Africa 
tor much ol its security needs. Such dependence has pinned Lesotho to a corner 
where its foreign policy choices have become constrained by the preferences o f 
South Africa (Swatuk, 1988),
In terms o f physical terrain, the country is mostly mountainous with only 11 
percent of arable land. It has no forest and woodland but has about 66 percent of 
permanent pastures. According to a 1993 estimate, Lesotho has only about 30 sq. 
kilometres o f irrigated lands although 86 percent of its resident population is 
engaged in agriculture. Fanning and other agriculture activities in the country are 
thus nearly entirely dependent on the mercies o f the largely erratic rains. This 
environmental adversity is compounded by occasional droughts, which have 
forced settlement on marginal lands thus causing overgrazing, severe soil erosion 
and soil exhaustion. As a result over 80 percent of the country's food and 
agricultural requirements are obtained externally and mostly from South Africa. 
Lesotho has few natural resources besides water. It has a fragile industrial base 
with most o f its small-scale industries owned by South Africans, Chinese and 
Indians. Industrial production growth rate was estimated in 1995 at paltry 19.7%, 
a rate that is grossly inadequate to march the country's population growth 
estimated at more than 2%. Consequently. Lesotho faces an acute unemployment 
problem - about 45%, second only to Mozambique (47%) in the whole o f Africa 
(Africa Information Centre, 1999).
Against a backdrop o f weak agricultural and industrial bases, Lesotho has a 
narrow7 revenue base. The main sources o f its revenue have historically been 
custom duties, migrant remittances, foreign aid and. to a lesser extent, tourism. 
Custom duties remain a major source o f revenue to the country'. In the 1993/94, 
94/95 and 95/96 fiscal years, for example, custom revenue accounted for 59.1%, 
88.5% and 53.9% of the government's total revenue respectively (Central Bank 
of Lesotho, 1997: 33). Similarly, migrant remittances have remained a key source 
o f revenue. Since the 1960s Lesotho has had about quarter o f its working age 
population (approximately 100,000) employed in South Africa, mostly in the 
mines (Matlosa, 1996). In 1990, migrant remittances added 67% to the country's 
GDP. The number of Lesotho migrant workers has, however, declined steadily
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since 1991 following massive retrenchments in the South African mines. 
Consequently, migrant remittances to Lesotho have plummeted. In 1996, for 
example, remittances added only 33% to GDP. Like many Sub-Saharan African 
countries, Lesotho has relied heavily on foreign aid, which has increased its 
indebtedness. Although Lesotho's current external debt o f $462 million (Central 
Bank o f  Lesotho, 1997: 40) is small compared to other African countries, it is 
nevertheless huge given the small size and the fragility o f the country's economy. 
The above attributes clearly give a picture of a country located precariously in 
economic terms, a country in which the broad mass of the population is at best 
surviving on the margins; where resources arc scarce and where competition for 
them is keen.
The negative impact o f Lesotho's fledgling economy on its democracy has been 
recognised by many observers who have been following political trends in the tiny 
Kingdom. Either directly or indirectly these observers see the post-election 
conflict in Lesotho essentially as a struggle for resources. For example, analysing 
its causes Matlosa (1999), argues that the contestation among political 
constituencies in the post-election period reflects Lesotho's deep structural and 
institutional crisis marked by a resource poor labour reserve economy, 
landlockedness, the heavy dependence of the country on South Africa, and the 
predominantly state-based accumulation trajectory. In his view the conjuncture 
o f these interrelated factors created inauspicious economic conditions under 
which the state became the channel o f accumulation. The post-election conflict 
was therefore not superficially over the electoral results per se, but reflected 
another manifestation o f the struggle among various constituencies for control 
over the state.
Arguing in the same tradition, Sekatle (1999) suggests that the culture of 
controverting the outcome of polls and in particular rejecting electoral defeat by 
parties, which has characterised Lesotho’s electoral politics, results from power 
struggle in a poor country where the control of power means the control o f state 
resource. These struggles are exacerbated, and frequently complicated, by the 
partisan rather than neutral postures of certain key state institutions, including the 
military, the monarchy, and the country's ecclesiastical establishment. Increasing 
the tendency for the rejection o f electoral results is the "first past the post"
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electoral system practised in Lesotho, which by definition does not provide for 
representation for a wide section o f the voters. Thus a more inclusive electoral 
system such as proportional representation may eliminate or minimise the scale 
o f future election-related conflicts.
While tacitly alluding to the role of the country's fragile economy in generating 
conflicts, Makoa (1999) goes further to suggest that the causes o f Lesotho's 
political instability are partly attributable to the country's political leaders. 
Focusing on the post-election conflict o f 1998, he notes the intransigence o f 
Basotho political elite and, in particular, its persistent failures to strive for 
domestic solutions to internal disputes. At a deeper level, however, such elite- 
centred arguments underscore the conventional resource-focused argument, which 
emphasises on the struggle for control o f state power and resources. Against a 
backdrop o f the intense struggle for power, the elite will naturally be inclined 
towards external solutions that facilitate the maintenance o f the status quo than 
internal settlements that may necessitate the granting o f concessions in the form 
of power sharing. In a sense, then, all the arguments are rooted in the intense 
competition for state control. As it became clear, the IPA which represented a 
compromise institution but which invariably became a political constituency, 
engaged in long hours of debate with the government over accommodation for its 
members and budgetary allocation (Lentsoe La Basotho (24 December 1998 - 6 
January 1999, p. 2). The economic explanation thus underlines the enormous 
challenge facing the country’s democratic experiment. Yet, this is not to paint a 
pessimistic picture for Lesotho in its drive towards democratic stability. On the 
contrary, compared to most African states, Lesotho possesses enormous potential 
for democratic consolidation.
Prospects for democratic stability in Lesotho
It was opined earlier on that despite its precarious economy, which contributes 
significantly to the intensification o f competition among political the elite, 
Lesotho stands a chance o f becoming a democratic model for Southern Africa. 
This proposition is premised on a number of factors, which are briefly elucidated 
in the following analysis. First, Lesotho ranks high among the few sub-Saharan 
African states that boast o f national homogeneity. Although there is no
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conclusive correlation between a homogenous society and stability (at least as 
demonstrated by Somalia's inter-clan wars in the early 1990s), ideally a society 
with few or no ethnic differences would be less prone to conflicts than one with 
m ultiple lines o f division. Nigeria with close to 500 tribes, superimposed by 
religious differences, for example, will face far greater difficulties in arriving at 
national consensus than Lesotho, with fewer and less pronounced lines o f 
division. The homogeneous character of the Basotho nation thus gives it a unique 
advantage of being in a position to resolve differences with minimal efforts than 
would cost multi-ethnic societies. However, this is not to suggest that 
homogenous societies are totally absolved from differences and conflicts. On the 
contrary, such societies are frequently marked by other cleavages such as religion, 
ideology and political affiliation, which are easily exploited and manipulated by 
ambitious and opportunistic politicians. Such non-tribal cleavages have largely 
defined Lesotho’s political crisis. In the absence o f effective institutional 
mechanisms to mitigate tensions generated by such sub-cleavages, the political 
system will most certainly face political tremors. Given its homogeneity, Lesotho 
has higher chances of containing its domestic conflicts.
Second, along with formal state institutions, Lesotho's monarchy can play an 
effective mediatory role in times of disagreements among political constituencies. 
In doing this the monarchy will not be setting a precedent. Indeed, the Japanese, 
Thai and Swedish monarchs have at various points facilitated the resolution o f 
conflicts among political players in their respective countries. The Lesotho 
monarchy does not require extraordinary constitutional powers to be effective in 
mediation. Rather, what it needs is simply the ability to command popular 
confidence to act impartially. This will in turn entail the ability to refrain from 
acts that may suggest partisanship in conflicts. However, the monarchy will 
require double efforts to convince sections o f its increasingly sceptical subjects 
o f its ability to be neutral in conflicts given its apparently partisan postures in 
previous conflicts (Sekatle, 1999). Indeed, some have attributed the immediate 
cause of the post-election conflict to the controversial role and partisan position 
o f the King (Hoohlo, 1999). Hoohlo argues further that, the Monarchy has not 
only aided certain political parties to achieve by foul means what they could not 
achieve by fair means, but it has also contributed to the demise o f established 
regimes, including popularly elected ones as were the cases in 1986 and 1994.
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Indeed, the monarchy's protection o f demonstrators who occupied the palace for 
days confirmed suspicions that it was pitting itself not as an ally but as a rival o f 
the government. In spite of these negative perceptions about it, the monarchy can 
still constitute a catalyst for conflict resolution and democratic development. The 
basic tool in this regard is for the monarchy to project itself as a sacrosanct 
institution, dedicated to the cause o f justice and fairplay. This way, it also 
strengthens its mediatory capacity, a requirement needed for Lesotho's long-term 
stability.
Thirdly, in contrast to many African countries, the Basotho society appears 
accommodative of dissent, tolerant of opposition and generally conciliatory. This 
was reflected in the government's long patience with many weeks o f protests. 
Typical African regimes like Sani Abacha's, Arap Moi's or Robert Mugabe's, for 
example, would have descended mercilessly on even a day's protest. Moreover, 
the post-conflict inter-party talks are indicative o f the ability o f the contending 
parties to reconcile. Few countries, which have gone through similar or graver 
conflicts, could agree at short notice to sit around a conference table. Although 
the scale of the Lesotho post-election conflict could neither march that in Angola 
nor in the Democratic Republic o f Congo (DRC). these war-torn countries can 
still provide some basis for comparison in terms o f warring parties' ability to 
reconcile. Both Angola and the DRC epitomise the real difficulties in bringing 
warring factions into reconciliation. The ability of Lesotho’s contesting parties 
to agree to talks is indicative o f the culture of tolerance in the society, a culture 
which is a key requirement for democratic stability. Also, the on-going inter-party 
conferences aimed at evolving a new electoral system, as opposed to the current 
first past the post system, will go a long way to increase representation for non­
winning parties and ultimately limit the incidence o f election-related conflicts.
Finally, the geographical location o f Lesotho, specifically, its encirclement by 
South Africa provides mixed blessings for democracy in the former. Depending 
on how the big neighbour responds to internal conflicts in Lesotho, the former 
may help build and strengthen democracy in the latter. For economic, political 
and security reasons South Africa has considerable interest in Lesotho's long­
term stability. As the 1998 Lesotho crisis showed. South Africa will be the first 
to respond if stability in the mountain Kingdom is threatened. Pretoria thus has
compelling reasons to help stabilise future political turbulence in Lesotho. One 
way it can do this is to provide swift non-military resources (in the form of 
negotiating teams and platforms) when conflict drums begin to beat in Lesotho. 
This, however, has to be done in a way that does not compromise Lesotho's 
sovereignty. At the same time, South Africa's response to future crisis in Lesotho 
will also depend on the nature o f the conflicts and, in particular, the rapidity o f 
the turn of events. Aware of the considerable disaffection the Pretoria-led military 
intervention has caused among a large proportion o f the Basotho, and having 
exposed its inconsistent postures in foreign policy as far as involvement in 
regional conflicts is concerned. South Africa will be more cautious with its future 
interventions in Lesotho. In other words, South Africa will weigh it options more 
carefully rather than engage in a hasty intervention. It will, for example, attempt 
to use dialogue rather than engaging in the onerous task o f mobilising regional 
contingents to undertake forcible stabilisation. If Pretoria adopts the latter option, 
the floodgates will be opened not only for an enduring relationship between South 
Africa and Lesotho, but it will also ensure real possibilities for stability in the 
latter.
Conclusion
Clearly the trend o f disputing the results of electoral polls does not only 
undermine the electoral process, but it also strikes at the core o f democracy. But 
the practice o f controverting electoral outcomes and refusing to accept defeat is 
symptomatic of the absence of a true democratic culture. What has been 
polemical is the cause of democratic decadence. A myriad of explanations has 
attempted to unravel the secrets to the problems o f democracy. However, as the 
paper has shown, the economic argument is the most persuasive o f all. Like most 
African countries, Lesotho has a fragile economy, marked by scarcity, 
unemployment, poverty , and competition, all o f which are formidable hurdles for 
democracy. Thus, the practice of disputing electoral results reflects the struggle 
over the control o f the state, which has become the avenue for survival in a 
country o f increasing scarcity. However, compared to most African countries, 
Lesotho has the potential to consolidate its democracy. This optimism is fuelled 
by the convergence of factors, including the country's homogenous character, the 
existence o f a monarchy, the culture of tolerance and accommodation displayed
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by Basotho, and the positive role South Africa is capable o f playing towards 
Lesotho's democratic stability. These factors are helpful in the short term in 
mitigating disruptive conflicts. However, like most countries in sub-Saharan 
Africa, Lesotho will have to address poverty, unemployment and scarcity, which 
generate and intensify conflicts, as a long term solution to its perennial political 
crisis.
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